We study a contest with multiple (not necessarily equal) prizes. Contestants have private information about an ability parameter that a¤ects their costs of bidding. The contestant with the highest bid wins the …rst prize, the contestant with the second-highest bid wins the second prize, and so on until all the prizes are allocated. All contestants incur their respective costs of bidding. The contest's designer maximizes the expected sum of bids. Our main results are: 1) We display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear, convex or concave cost functions, and for any distribution of abilities. 2) If the cost functions are linear or concave, then, no matter what the distribution of abilities is, it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single "…rst" prize. 3) We give a necessary and su¢cient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function.
Introduction
In 1902 Francis Galton posed the following problem:
"A certain sum, say £100, is available for two prizes to be awarded at a forthcoming competition; the larger one for the …rst of the competitors, the smaller one for the second. How should the £100 be most suitably divided between the two ? What ratio should a …rst prize bear to that of a second one ? Does it depend on the number of competitors, and if so, why ?" Galton (Biometrika, Vol.1, 1902) In his article Galton proposes a ratio of 3 to 1 to the above question. Since Galton does not explicitly state what is the contest designer's goal, his answer is somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, his work is important for it pioneered both the scienti…c literature on contests and the use of order statistics (The ratio 3 to 1 appears as the ratio of expected di¤erences involving the …rst three order statistics for a large number of contestants whose abilities are normally distributed.)
Many economic, social and biological situations are contests where agents spend resources in order to increase to probability of winning a prize. Several well known examples are: rent-seeking and lobbying inside organizations; R&D rivalry; sport competitions; arms races and other economic or biological …ghts and "wars of attrition"; job promotion in labor markets; political campaigns; artistic competitions such as piano or architectural contests.
Given the wealth of examples, it is not surprising that the economic literature on contests is very large. Most of the literature has focused on the case of one prize. Models with complete information about the value of the prize include: Tullock (1980) , Varian (1980) , Rosen (1986) , Hillman and Samet (1987) , Baye et al (1996) . The last paper o¤ers a complete characterization of equilibrium behavior. Models with incomplete information about the prize's value to different contestants include Weber (1985) , Hillman and Riley (1989) , Amann and Leininger (1996) , and Krishna and Morgan (1997) . Clark and Riis (1998) study contests with multiple identical prizes under complete information and focus on simultaneous versus sequential designs. Barut and Kovenock (1998) and Glazer and Hassin (1988) allow for non-identical prizes in a complete information model. The latter paper also includes a result for a model with incomplete information (see below).
The use of contests in order to extract e¤ort under "moral hazard" conditions has been emphasized by, among others, Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Green and Stokey (1981) , and Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) . A common assumption in these papers is that (observed) output is a stochastic function of the unobservable e¤ort. All agents have the same (known) ability. Lazear and Rosen derive the optimal prize structure in a contest with two workers and two prizes (so that, in fact, only the di¤erence in prizes matters) and compare it to optimal piece rates. They also brie ‡y discuss a model with heterogenous workers and the e¢ciency properties of having contests where such workers mix.
In this paper we address Galton's problem in the following framework: Several agents engage in a contest where multiple prizes with known and common values are awarded. Each contestant i submits a bid (or undertakes an observable "e¤ort"): The contestant with the highest bid wins the …rst prize, the contestant with the second-highest bid wins the second prize, and so on until all the prizes are allocated. All contestants (including those that did not win any prize) incur a cost that is a strictly increasing function of their bid. This function is common knowledge. We di¤erentiate among the cases where the cost function is, respectively, linear, concave or convex in e¤ort. The cost function of contestant i also depends on a parameter (say "ability") that is private information to that player. The main assumption we make is one of separability between ability and bid in the cost function. Abilities are drawn independently of each other according to an arbitrary distribution function which is common knowledge. We assume that each contestant chooses his bid in order to maximize expected utility (given the other competitors' bids and given the values of the di¤erent prizes).
The goal of the contest designer is to maximize the total expected e¤ort (i.e, the expected sum of the bids) at the contest 1 . This …ts well in the tournament literature. Good examples are sport competitions, promotions in organizations, architectural contests and the grading of exams.
The designer can determine the number of prizes (i.e., the number of prizes having positive value) and the distribution of the …xed total prize sum among the di¤erent prizes.
It is worth to note here the theoretical distinction between having one prize (or several equal prizes) and having several unequal prizes. If there is only one prize, or if there are several equal prizes, each contestant perceives two payo¤-relevant alternatives: I win a prize, or I win nothing. Hence, bids will be determined by one variable -the di¤erence in expected payo¤ between those two alternatives. (Note that the same logic applies if there are two unequal prizes but only two contestants). In contrast, if there are at least two unequal prizes and at least three contestants, each contestant perceives at least three payo¤ relevant alternatives (I win the …rst prize, I win the second prize,..., I win nothing). Bids will be determined in a more complex way by several variables -the di¤erences in expected payo¤ among the various alternatives 2 . We display bidding equilibria for any number of prizes and contestants, for any distribution of abilities, and for linear, concave or convex cost functions. In order to have a less technical exposition, we focus however on the designer's problem in the case where she can award two (potentially unequal) prizes, and where there are at least three contestants. As explained above, this case already displays the main ingredient for complexity in bidding. Moreover, it will become clear that none of our qualitative results changes if we allow for more than two prizes.
Our answers to Galton's questions are as follows: 1) We show that for any number of contestants having linear or concave cost functions, and for any distribution of abilities, it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single "…rst" prize. 2) We give a necessary and su¢cient conditions ensuring that (at least) two prizes are optimal if the contestants have convex cost functions. Depending on the parameters, the optimal prize structure may involve then several equal prizes or di¤erent prizes whose ratio can be easily computed.
Several related results appear in Barut and Kovenock (1998) and Glazer and Hassin (1988) . Barut and Kovenock study a multi-prize contest where players have linear cost functions and have the same ability. In this symmetric, complete information environment, they show that the optimal prize structure allows any combination of K ¡1 prizes, where K is the number of contestants. (In particular, allocating the entire prize sum to a unique …rst prize is optimal.) Our result for linear cost functions (that allows for private information, asymmetries among contestants and is independent of the number of contestants) suggests that the only robust optimal prize structure is the one involving a unique …rst prize.
Besides studying the symmetric equilibria of a complete information model as above, Glazer and Hassin (1988) also propose an incomplete information model that is more general than ours since it allows for both cost functions that are not necessarily separable in ability and bid and for a concave prize-valuation function. But they are not able to compute equilibria, and their indirect results (based on several implicit and unproven assumptions) only deal with the case of a separable and linear cost function, a linear prize-valuation function and a uniform ability distribution such that the lowest ability type has an in…nite cost of bidding. With these assumptions, they show that a unique …rst prize is optimal.
We now want to describe the intuition behind our main results. The equilibrium bid function for contestants with linear cost functions is a function of the values of the di¤erent prizes and of the ability of that contestant. If there are p prizes, this function involves the distribution of the …rst p order-statistics. Moreover, the equilibrium bid is increasing in ability. A nice property of the di¤erential equation arising from the …rst-order condition of the contestants' maximization problem allows us to easily compute the equilibrium bid for contestants with general (i.e., concave or convex) cost functions: this is simply equal to the inverse of the cost function applied to the equilibrium bid for linear cost functions.
To simplify the exposition, we assume for the following descriptive details that the contestants have linear cost functions.
The marginal e¤ect of the …rst prize on the equilibrium bid function is positive for all possible abilities (or "types"). Since a player with higher ability has a higher chance to win the …rst prize, the marginal e¤ect of the …rst price is an increasing function of ability.
The marginal e¤ect of the second-prize is ambiguous. Consider, for example, a player with the highest possible ability. If such a player is present at the contest, he is sure to win the …rst prize. Subtracting a penny from the …rst prize and adding it to the second prize lowers the expected utility of such a player (since he never gets the second prize), and he will consequently bid less. Similarly, the marginal e¤ect of the second prize on the equilibrium bid function is negative for players with high enough abilities (and hence this e¤ect is lower that the marginal e¤ect of the …rst prize for such types). The marginal e¤ect of the second price is, however, positive for middle and low ability players. Moreover, for contestants with abilities below a certain threshold, the (positive) marginal e¤ect of the second prize is higher than the marginal e¤ect of the …rst prize, since these types of player have a higher chance to get the second-prize.
Consider now the contest designer: She has to allocate a …xed prize sum among the two prizes, and she wants to maximize the average (i.e., expected) bid of each contestant. The relevant variable for the designer is then the average di¤erence between the marginal e¤ects of the second prize and the …rst prize, respectively. This average di¤erence is precisely the marginal e¤ect of the second prize on the designer's revenue (i.e., the change in the designer's revenue if she subtracts a penny from the value of the …rst prize and adds it to the value of the secondprize). If the average marginal e¤ect of the …rst prize is higher than the average marginal e¤ect of the second-prize then the average di¤erence is negative, the designer's goal function is a decreasing function of the value of the second-prize, and the designer should award only a unique (…rst) prize -this turns out to be the case for contestants with linear cost functions. To obtain the marginal e¤ect of the second prize on the designer's revenue for contestants with concave cost functions, one multiplies the above di¤erence by a function that is increasing in ability. Hence the terms where the …rst-prize is dominant (corresponding to high ability types) get magni…ed in relation to the terms where the second prize is dominant (low ability types). Given the result for the linear cost functions, the designer's revenue is also a decreasing function of the value of the second-prize, and the designer should award only a unique (…rst) prize. The opposite happens for convex cost functions: the terms where the second prize is dominant get magni…ed, and two prizes may be optimal (since, by de…nition, the designer cannot award only a second prize). In such cases, the optimal allocation of the prize sum among the two prizes depends on the number of contestants, the distribution of abilities, and the e¤ort cost function.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the contest model with multiple prizes and private information about a parameter (e.g. ability) entering cost functions. In Section 3 we focus on linear cost functions. We derive the equilibrium bid functions and we formulate the contest designer's problem .
We then prove several properties that characterize the marginal e¤ects of the …rst-and the second-prize on each type of contestant . Finally, we use these properties to prove that it is always optimal to award a single prize. In Section 4 we use the result obtained above in order to study the optimal prize structure for contestants with concave and convex cost functions. Finally, we illustrate the (non-trivial) optimal prize structure in an example with convex cost functions. In Section 5 we gather several concluding comments.
The Model
Consider a contest where p prizes are awarded. The value of the j ¡ th prize is V j , where V 1¸V2¸: ::¸V p . The values of the prizes are common knowledge. We assume that
The set of contestants is K = f1; 2; :::; kg. Without loss of generality we can assume that k¸p (i.e., there are at least as many contestants as there are prizes).
At the contest each player i makes a bid x i : Bids are submitted simultaneously. A bid x i causes a disutility (or cost) denoted by c i°( x i ); where°: R + ! R + is a strictly increasing function with°(0) = 0; and where c i > 0 is an ability parameter 3 . Note that a low c i means that i has a high ability (i.e., lower cost) and vice-versa.
The ability (or type) of contestant i is private information to i: Abilities are drawn independently of each other from an interval [m; 1] according to the distribution function F (¢); which is common knowledge. We assume that F (¢) has a continuous density F 0 (¢) > 0: In order to avoid in…nite bids caused by zero costs, we assume that m; the type with highest possible ability, is strictly positive 4 . The contestant with the highest bid wins the …rst prize V 1 . The contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize V 2 , and so on until all the prizes are allocated 5 . That is, the payo¤ of contestant i who has ability c i , and submits a bid x i is either V j ¡ c i°( x i ) if i wins prize j; or ¡c i°( x i ) if i does not win a prize.
Each contestant i chooses his bid in order to maximize expected utility (given the other competitors' bids and the values of the di¤erent prizes.)
The contest designer determines the number of prizes having positive value and the distribution of the total prize sum among the di¤erent prizes in order to 3 The treatment of the case in which i 0 s cost function is given by ±(c i )°(x i ) , where ±(¢) is strictly monotone increasing, is completely analogous. The main assumption here is the separability of ability and bid. 4 The case where m = 0 can be treated as well, but requires slightly di¤erent methods. The choice of the interval [m; 1] is a normalization. 5 If h > 1 bids tie for a prize, each respective bidder gets the prize with probability maximize the expected value of the sum of the bids P k i=1 x i (given the contestants' equilibrium bid functions).
Linear Cost Functions
In this Section we assume that the cost functions are linear, i.e.,°(x) = x: As we shall see below, both the equilibrium bid functions and the optimal prize structure in this case will be very important for the derivations in the other cases.
The next Proposition displays the equilibrium bid when there are two prizes. As mentioned in the introduction, if there are only two contestants, the situation is isomorphic to the one where there is a unique prize whose value is equal to the di¤erence between the two prizes. Hence, it is trivially true that awarding a unique prize is optimal for the contest's designer. Therefore, we assume below that the number of contestants is at least three, i.e., k¸3. In the Appendix we also provide the general formula for the bid functions with p > 2 prizes.
Proposition 3.1. In a symmetric equilibrium, the bid function of each contestant is given by b(c) = A(c)V 1 + B(c)V 2 where:
Proof. See Appendix
The Designer's Problem
Let V 2 = ® and
(since the second prize must be smaller than the …rst). By Proposition 3.1, each contestant's equilibrium bid function is given by
The average bid of each contestant is given by
Since there are k contestants, the seller's problem is:
The above problem is equivalent to:
The solution to Problem 3.3 is extremely simple: if the integral is positive, then the optimal ® is 1 2 (i.e., award two equal prizes). Otherwise, the optimal ® is zero (i.e., award a unique prize).
The next Proposition shows that the integral appearing in Problem 3.3 is negative. We also list several other properties of the marginal e¤ects, A(c) and B(c); that are used in the proof and in other parts of the paper. 7.
Proof. See Appendix. Proposition 3.2-7 shows that the solution to Problem 3.3 must be ® = 0 6 : Hence we have obtained:
Proposition 3.3. For any number of contestants with linear cost functions, and for any distribution of abilities in the population, it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single …rst prize.
6 As noted in the introduction, we can easily deal with the case where the designer wants,say, to minimize the the expected sum of bids. In that case it is obvious by the above analysis that two equal prizes (® = 1 2 ) are optimal .
The result above holds even if, a-priori, the seller is allowed to award more than two prizes. Indeed, assume that the optimal prize structure is (V The following example illustrates the above results. In particular, we give explicit formulas for the equilibrium bid functions for the case where the distribution of abilities is uniform. ; i.e., abilities are uniformly distributed on the interval [m; 1]: We obtain that:
Assume now that k = 3; m = 
Concave and Convex Cost Functions
Assume now that bidder i with ability c has a cost function given by c°(¢) such that°(0) = 0;°0(¢) > 0: Let g(¢) =°¡ 1 (¢);and observe that g 0 (¢) > 0:
Proposition 4.1. In a symmetric equilibrium, the bid function of each contestant is given by
where A(c) and B(c) are de…ned by equations 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Proof. See Appendix.
The Designer's Problem
Let V 1 = 1 ¡ ®; and V 2 = ® , where 0 · ® · 1 2
: Analogous to the case of linear cost functions, the designer's problem is given by
The designer's revenue as a function of the value of the second prize is:
and that:
Observe also that
and that
since this last term is the derivative of the equilibrium bid function for contestants having linear cost functions. We can now prove the following:
Proposition 4.2. For any number of contestants with concave cost functions, and for any distribution of abilities in the population, it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single …rst prize. 
Hence, the designer's payo¤ function has a maximum at ® = 0; and a single prize is optimal. Proposition 4.3. Consider a contest where contestants have convex cost functions. A necessary and su¢cient condition for the optimality of two prizes is given by
If condition 4.7 is satis…ed 7 then it is either optimal to award two prizes V 1 = 1¡® ] we have
If condition 4.7 is satis…ed then we have:
Hence, the revenue function R(®) cannot have a maximum at ® = 0: It either has a maximum at ® ¤ such that R 0 (® ¤ ) = 0 or at ® = 1 2 : For the converse, assume that two prizes are optimal. This means that ® = 0 is not a maximum of R(®). If condition 4.7 is not satis…ed we obtain R 0 (0) · 0. Together with R 00 (®) · 0 for all ® 2 [0;
1 2
] we obtain a contradiction. 
Concluding Comments
We have studied the optimal prize structure in multi-prize contests where players have private information about their abilities. In order to maximize the expected sum of bids, the designer should award a single prize if contestants have linear or concave cost functions. If the contestants have convex cost functions, then two prizes (or more) may be optimal. The optimal proportion between the prizes' values depends then on the number of contestants, the distribution of abilities in the population, and on the exact form of the cost function.
What can we say about Galton's proposal to have a …rst prize which is three times higher than the second prize ? Assume that contestants have linear cost functions. It can be easily shown that, when the number of contestants goes to in…nity (this was the actual case envisaged by Galton) , the average di¤erence between the marginal e¤ects of the two prizes goes to zero. Hence, the designer becomes indi¤erent between awarding one prize or two prizes (in any proportion). In particular, Galton's 3 : 1 proportion becomes approximately optimal.
We see several avenues for future research: 1) Combine the model of private information about abilities with the earlier models where output depend stochastically on e¤ort, and only output can be observed. 2) Perform comparative static exercises about the …ne e¤ects of changes in the distribution of abilities or in the form of the cost functions when these are convex. 3) Compare simultaneous contests with sequential contests. 4) Conduct empirical studies about the optimal prize structure in observed contests, such as architectural competitions.
Francis Galton concluded his article with the following remark:
"I now commend the subject to mathematicians in the belief that those who are capable, which I am not, of treating it more thoroughly, may …nd that further investigations will repay trouble in unexpected directions" (Galton, 1902) The challenge was immediately picked by the famous statistician Karl Pearson, at that time editor of Biometrika. His notes at the end of Galton's article contain a complete solution of the statistical problem posed (calculate the ratio of expected di¤erences among order statistics), but does not refer to the original question of prize allocation in contests. It is now up to the reader to decide whether we, humble economists, have made a contribution. 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Assume that all contestants in the set Knfig bid according to b(¢) , and assume that the bid function is strictly monotonic and di¤erentiable.
Player i's maximization problem reads:
Let y(¢) denote the inverse function of b(¢): Using strict monotonicity and symmetry, the …rst order condition is:
Note that the right hand side of the FOC is a function of y only (i.e., this is a di¤erential equation with separated variables).
A contestant with the lowest possible ability c = 1 can either never win a prize (if k > 2) or wins for sure the second prize (if k = 2): Hence the optimal bid of this type is always zero, and this yields the boundary condition y(0) = 1;
The solution to the di¤erential equation with the boundary condition is given by :
We obtain that x = G(y) = G(b ¡1 (x)); and therefore that b(¢) = G(¢): Thus, the bid function of every player is given by b(c) = A(c)V 1 + B(c)V 2 ; where:
We now check that the candidate equilibrium function b(¢) is strictly monotonic decreasing (it is clearly di¤erentiable). Note …rst that
for all c 2 [m; 1):We have also
Because V 1¸V2 we obtain for all c 2 [m; 1) :
Assuming that all contestants other than i bid according to b(¢); we …nally need to show that, for any type c of player i; the bid b(c) maximizes the expected utility of that type. The necessary …rst-order condition is clearly satis…ed (since this is how we "guessed" b(c) to start with). We now show that a su¢cient second-order condition (called "pseudoconcavity") is satis…ed. Let
k¡2 ¡ cx be the expected utility of player i with type c that makes a bid x:
We will show that the derivative ¼ x (c; x) is nonnegative if x is smaller than b(c) and nonpositive if x is larger than b(c): As ¼(x; c) is continuous in x; this implies that ¼(x; c) is maximized at x = b(c). The symmetric equilibrium with p prizes: Fix agent i; and let F s (a); 1 · s · p; denote the probability that agent i with type a meets k ¡ 1 competitors such that s ¡ 1 of them have lower types, and k ¡ s have higher types. Recall that in equilibrium we expect i to bid more than competitors with higher types (lower ability). Hence F s (¢) is exactly the probability of winning the s 0 th prize. We have then
The corresponding derivatives are given by
and by
for s > 1.
Note that A(c) =
Analogously to the case of two prizes, the equilibrium bid for any number of prizes p , any number of contestants k¸p with linear cost functions is given by:
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Recall that : A(c) = (k¡1)
1. This is obvious by de…nition.
k¡2 F 0 (c) < 0 for all c 2 [m; 1) and A 0 (1) = 0:
4. For for all c 2 [c ¤ ; 1) we obtain that
For k > 2 we obtain that j B 0 (c) j ¡ j A 0 (c) j is positive for c close enough to 1 (since kF (c) > 2 for such types.) 5. We have
The last inequality follows by noting that the integrand in the …rst integral is negative and that the integrand of the second integral is positive. If we multiply both integrands by the increasing function h(a) = a we strictly increase the value of the sum of the two integrals. In order to prove that B(m) < 0 it is then enough to prove that
By the change of variable z = F (a);we obtain
6. This follows by combining all properties above. Player i's maximization problem reads:
Using strict monotonicity and symmetry, the …rst order condition is:
Note that this is also an ordinary di¤erential equation with separated variables (i.e. the left hand side of the …rst equation is a function of x only; while the right hand side is a function of y only:
Integration and the use of the boundary condition y(1) = 0 yield°(x) = G(y), where G(y) is de…ned exactly as in the proof of Proposition 3.1 (see equation 7.2) Hence, we obtain that x =°¡ 1 (G(y)) = g(G(b ¡1 (x))) and that b(¢) = g(G(¢)): For the su¢cient second-order condition we proceed exactly as in the proof of Proposition 3.1. Using the notation employed in that proof, we have
Di¤erentiating ¼ x (x; c) with respect to c yields ¼ xc (x; c) = ¡°0(x) < 0: That is, the function ¼ x (x; ¢) is decreasing in c, exactly as in the linear case. The proof of pseudoconcavity is concluded as in that case.
Analogously to the case of two prizes, the equilibrium bid for any number of prizes p , and any for number of contestants k¸p with cost functions of the form c°(x) is given by:
s (a)da) (7.6) where F 0 s (a) is given in formulas 7.3 and 7.4.
